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INTRODUCTION 
Ten years ago, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights1 (TRIPs) took the high road to intellectual 
property harmonization to create equal trading partners among the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Members.  At that time, the TRIPs 
Agreement contemplated that all member countries would establish the 
agreed-upon minimum standards and prioritize international trade 
obligations as a means to achieve national goals.2  The TRIPs 
Agreement accounted for differing levels of national development by 
permitting no more than ten years of derogation from international 
obligations.3  Only five years later, at Doha, the AIDS crisis highlighted 
that compromising pressing national responsibilities—like a looming 
public health crisis—to fulfill international obligations may, in fact, 
detrimentally affect international trade.4  Thus, the separate Declaration 
on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health adopted at Doha5 made 
concessions to balance international trade obligations with national 
welfare issues, focusing especially on creating accessibility to medication 
in the least developed nations.6  Despite the efforts, an acceptable 
framework of solutions allowing those least developed nations to 
benefit from Doha is yet forthcoming.7  Meanwhile, this year marks the 
 
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs 
Agreement].  See generally J. H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement:  
Introduction to a Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 363 (1996). 
2. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 7. 
3. Id. arts. 65, 70(8)–(9). 
4. See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public 
Health of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha 
Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health]. 
5. Id. 
6. See id. 
7. See Trade Negotiations Committee, Report by the Chairman of the Trade 
Negotiations Committee to the General Council, TN/C/5 (July 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news05_e/gc_tnc5_e.pdf.  The Director General of the 
WTO, Supachi Panchipakadi, has hoped to find a solution for the issues raised at Doha.  
Although the WTO has attempted to address the issue of implementation of paragraph 6, the 
results have been unsatisfactory.  See World Trade Organization General Council, 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003), available at http://docsonline.wto.org (follow “Simple 
Search” hyperlink; and enter document symbol in search field) [hereinafter Implementation 
of Paragraph 6]; Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision:  World Pharmaceutical 
Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317 (2005) (discussing in detail 
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tenth anniversary of TRIPs and the end of the transitional period.8  The 
future success of TRIPs increasingly depends on its ability to address 
national responsibilities9 that may impede member countries from 
successfully fulfilling international obligations. 
This Article suggests that policy options embraced by countries like 
India, which prioritized national responsibilities in its quest to appear on 
the global trade map, should be revisited as possibilities for jump-
starting ailing economies.  After all, even the developed nations 
themselves embraced such options before occupying the moral high 
ground as promoters of intellectual property rights.10  This Article also 
suggests that although such policy options may be legally vulnerable to 
WTO challenges, they can be instrumental in achieving the objectives of 
the TRIPs Agreement. 
Part I outlines the issues impeding access to medication in least 
developed nations.  Part II discusses the national issues that India faced, 
which led to the genesis of the Indian patent policy in the Ayyangar 
Committee Report.  The Ayyangar Report remains significant even 
today for its analysis of patent regimes and conclusions on what each 
aspect of the patent regime represents in terms of national ambitions.  
Part III outlines how India used its patent statute and drug policy to 
achieve the national goal of developing an indigenous pharmaceutical 
industry.  Part IV discusses how the Indian experience can be replicated 
in other nations.  The conclusion asserts that to create accessibility to 
medication, the contemporary experiences of the developed nations 
alone will provide an inadequate menu of choices for the least 
developed nations to emulate.  The objective of paragraph 6 of the 
Doha Declaration is not to create a theoretically perfect patent regime 
 
the implementation of paragraph 6 and concluding that it is not capable of fully addressing 
the AIDS crisis). 
8. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 65.  This date also coincides with the Sixth 
WTO Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong in December 2005.  See World Trade 
Organization, The Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
minist_e/min05_e/min05_e.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).  “The countries make their 
decisions through various councils and committees, whose membership consists of all WTO 
Members.  Topmost is the ministerial conference which has to meet at least once every two 
years.  The Ministerial Conference can take decisions on all matters under any of the 
multilateral trade agreements.”  WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, UNDERSTANDING THE 
WTO 101 (3d ed. 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/inbr_e.pdf. 
9. National responsibilities are issues—like poverty, health care, and local economic 
conditions affecting intellectual property implementation—that have a stake in development, 
democracy, and public order. 
10. See generally Srividhya Ragavan, Can’t We All Get Along?  The Case for a 
Workable Patent Model, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 117 (2003). 
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in least developed nations, but to enable accessibility to affordable 
medication.  Viewed from that perspective, the Indian experience can 
be a useful tool in the hands of the TRIPs Council. 
I.  THE EXISTENCE OF INEQUALS 
The Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health epitomizes the 
failed attempt at Uruguay to create equality amongst inequals by 
signing the TRIPs Agreement.  In granting concessions to the inequals, 
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration acknowledges the extent of that 
inequality by stating that “WTO members with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face 
difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the 
TRIPs Agreement.”11  Paragraph 6 categorizes the less-equal Members 
of the WTO, that is, the non-developed nations, into two classes:  (1) 
Members with insufficient manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector that may be able to benefit from compulsory 
licensing; and (2) Members with no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector and, thus, cannot benefit from compulsory 
licensing.12  Paragraph 6 encourages the more fortunate of the less-
equals, Members that fall into the former class (like India and Brazil), to 
manufacture generic drugs to tackle prevailing or potential public health 
needs and, thus, benefit from the concessions.13  Members belonging to 
the latter class, in which inadequate development impedes production of 
generic drugs, cannot benefit from the concessions.14  Development in 
these countries is so poor that not even generic drugs can be 
manufactured in these nations. 
Unfortunately, the logical option of importing life-saving generic 
medication to the countries lacking manufacturing capabilities is 
thwarted by the operation of Article 31(f) of TRIPs.15  By requiring 
Members to locally produce the compulsorily licensed patents, Article 
31(f) prevents least-developed countries from importing generic drugs 
from nations, like India, that produce them.16  Thus, the high point of 
 
11. Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health, supra note 4, ¶ 6. 
12. Id. 
13. See id. 
14. Id. 
15. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31(f). 
16. Id.  See generally Carlos M. Correa, Implications of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (2002), available at http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/ 
policy/WHO_EDM_PAR_2002.3.pdf. 
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the TRIPs tenure—the introduction in the Doha Declaration on TRIPs 
and Public Health of public interest safeguards in the form of the right 
to compulsorily license patented medication17—will remain useless 
where it is most needed. 
In effect, the paragraph 6 problem vis-à-vis the least developed 
nations is two-fold:  (1) the lack of immediate access to low-cost 
medication; and (2) the absence of local industrialization, which impairs 
the countries’ abilities to fully benefit from the Doha Declaration on 
TRIPs and Public Health.18  Conscious of the problem, the framers of 
the Doha Declaration delegated the task of finding an expeditious 
solution to the TRIPs Council and instructed it to “report to the 
General Council before the end of 2002.”19  The ambitious agenda 
notwithstanding, the TRIPs Council continues to work towards finding 
an appropriate solution before the conclusion of the Sixth Ministerial 
Meeting.20  Meanwhile, out of an estimated three million people 
scheduled to receive treatment for HIV, the virus that causes AIDS, 
barely one million are being treated.21  To address this problem 
realistically, this Article suggests that the TRIPs Council should 
examine how nations like India succeeded in establishing an indigenous 
pharmaceutical industry. 
The Indian experience is remarkable in its ability to address health 
care issues with a keen appreciation of practical national impediments. 22  
Notably, at the time of independence in 1947, Indians’ accessibility to 
medication was comparable to what currently exists in several least 
developed nations.23  By the end of the 1980s, India had developed its 
own indigenous pharmaceutical industry.24  During the South African 
 
17. Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health, supra note 4, ¶ 6. 
18. See generally id. 
19. Id. ¶ 6.  See generally Gardiner Harris & Rachel Zimmerman, Drug Makers Say 
WTO Setback Will Not Have Significant Impact, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2001, at B5. 
20. See Implementation of Paragraph 6, supra note 7; see also Abbott, supra note 7 
(criticizing the August 2003 resolution of the General Council). 
21. Leaders:  Too Much Morality, Too Little Sense:  AIDS, ECONOMIST (London), July 
30, 2005, at 13. 
22. See e.g., Ramesh Govindaraj & Gnanaraj Chellaraj, The Indian Pharmaceutical 
Sector:  Issues and Options for Health Sector Reform 1 (World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 
437, 2002) (“A detailed assessment of the pharmaceutical sector in developing countries, 
therefore, is an essential input into the formulation of viable policies to simultaneously 
promote pharmaceutical competitiveness, and mitigate the impact of rising drug prices while 
ensuring quality assurance.”). 
23. See infra notes 33–43 and accompanying text. 
24. See Govindaraj & Chellaraj, supra note 22, at 6 (discussing the extent of 
development). 
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AIDS crisis, and even during the anthrax crisis in the United States, 
India emerged as a reliable supplier of generic drugs.25  Therefore, 
India’s experience in developing a working patent policy may be of 
significant help in determining solution options to create a 
manufacturing capacity in least developed nations. 
II.  INTRODUCING A PATENT REGIME IN INDIA 
A.  The Background 
The East India Company introduced patent laws in India.26  The first 
Indian Patents Act was enacted in 1856 as a result of the 
recommendations of the Lord Macaulay Law Commission.27  This Act 
was followed by a series of amendments, such as the 1859 amendment to 
introduce exclusive privileges for making, selling, licensing, and using 
inventions.28  The Patterns and Designs Protection Act of 187229 
introduced legislation for the protection for industrial designs and was 
followed by the Protection of Inventions Act of 1883.30  The 1872 and 
1883 legislations were combined into the Inventions and Designs Act in 
1888.31  Finally, in 1911, the Indian Patents and Designs Act was 
enacted, repealing all these earlier enactments.32  The various 
 
25. See generally Manu Joseph, Indian Cipro Copies Don’t Pay Off, WIRED NEWS, 
Nov. 8, 2001, available at http://www.wired.com/news/conflict/0,2100,48153,00.html; Andrew 
Tanzer, Pill Factory to the World, FORBES, Dec. 10, 2001, at 70.  Indian generic drug 
companies like Cipla Ltd. and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories were willing to sell reverse-
engineered copies of Bayer’s anthrax-fighting Cipro for less than twenty cents per pill.  Id. 
26. The first patent law in India, enacted in 1856, was assented to by the Governor 
General on February 28, 1856.  First Indian Patent Law, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
(Tech. Info., Forecasting & Assessment Council (TIFAC)), Jan.–Feb. 2002, at 1, available at 
http://www.tifac.org.in/do/pfc/pub/jan02.pdf. 
27. The first Law Commission was established in 1834 under the Charter Act of 1833 
and under the Chairmanship of Lord Macaulay.  This Commission was responsible for the 
codification of the Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, and other legislation.  The 
second, third, and fourth Law Commissions were instituted in 1853, 1861, and 1879, 
respectively.  During a span of fifty years, the various commissions recommended legislation 
on a variety of subjects, based mostly on the adaptation of English laws to Indian conditions.  
The Patents Act was one such piece of legislation.  The first Indian patent legislation was 
modeled along the same lines as the British Patent Act of 1852.  See RAJIV JAIN & RAKHEE 
BISWAS, LAW OF PATENTS:  PROCEDURE & PRACTICE V, at 1.1–.6 (1999). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 1.2. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id.  The Patents Act of 1911 introduced the concept of the Controller of Industrial 
Patents and Designs.  After the enactment of the Patents Act in 1970, Part I of the earlier 
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intellectual property statutes lacked a clear policy to pave the way for 
industrial development through patents.  During this period, India was 
fighting for independence; therefore, the laws accommodated the needs 
of the colonial British Empire. 
After gaining independence in 1947, the Indian government set up 
law commissions styled after the British system to recommend legal 
reforms to achieve national objectives.  “[T]he Patents Enquiry 
Committee (1948–1950), also known as the Tek Chand committee, and 
the committee on the Revision of the Patents Law, also known as the 
Ayyangar committee (1957–1959), were appointed to review the 
adequacy of the Indian patent system and to adapt it to conform with 
national goals.”33  In reviewing the 1911 patent legislation, the Tek 
Chand Committee relied on the Report of the Swan Committee, 
appointed by the Board of Trade in the United Kingdom.34  The Tek 
Chand Committee concluded that India’s ill-defined patent provisions 
enabled multinational companies to gain patent rights beyond the scope 
of their inventions.35  The Tek Chand Committee recommended 
incorporating compulsory licensing provisions to minimize the potential 
for abuse of monopolies.36  Although the patent legislation in India was 
amended in 1950 to incorporate the recommendations regarding 
compulsory licensing, substantial changes did not result.37 
Meanwhile, the first Planning Commission, sought to improve “the 
standard of living of the people by efficient exploitation of the resources 
of the country” and to take stock of the state of the nation at that time 
in its First Five Year Plan.38  Statistics for the period revealed two 
 
legislation was separated into the Designs Act of 1911.  This Act protected industrial design 
until 2000 when it was repealed as a post-TRIPs measure in India. 
33. Shondeep Banerji, The Indian Intellectual Property Regime and the TRIPs 
Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EMERGING MARKETS 63 (Clarissa 
Long ed., 2000). 
34. N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE PATENTS LAW 
¶ 8 (1959) [hereinafter AYYANGAR REPORT]. 
35. Banerji, supra note 33, at 63–64.  The Tek Chand Committee noted that under the 
Patents Act of 1911, any invention that related to a “manner of manufacture” was patentable.  
Id. at 63.  The Ayyangar Committee recommended a clearer definition of “manner of 
manufacture,” and the Patents Act of 1970 was written using more specific language.  Id. at 
64–65; AYYANGAR REPORT, supra note 34, ¶¶ 46–49. 
36. AYYANGAR REPORT, supra note 34, ¶¶ 175–189. 
37. Banerji, supra note 33, at 66.  Several amendments were incorporated based on the 
Tek Chand Committee’s recommendations.  One of the results was the addition of a new 
section that vested in the Controller of Patents the power to grant a patent unless there were 
good reasons to refuse.  Id. 
38. The Planning Commission was set up in March 1950 by a resolution of the 
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startling realities.  First, India recorded a very high poverty index.39  
Income from industries accounted for a mere 6.6% of the gross annual 
national income.40  Only 8% of the total labor force worked in industrial 
establishments.41  Consequently, approximately 50% of India’s 
population lived in poverty.42  Second, India had the world’s highest rate 
of epidemic diseases.43  Of the total mortality, the rate from epidemic 
diseases was a high 5.1%.44  The poverty and disease conditions resulted 
in low life expectancy, much like what prevails in the least developed 
nations today. 
India recognized that its woes were exaggerated by the lack of 
indigenous production of bulk drugs.45  The cost of drugs was very high 
because the Central Government imported drugs.46  The heavy reliance 
on foreign manufacturers resulted in multinationals, which formed more 
than 90% of the Indian pharmaceutical industry, determining the 
availability and supply of drugs.47  Drug prices were so high that in 1961, 
Senator Estes Kefauver, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee, 
remarked that Indian drug prices ranked among the highest in the 
world.48  Today, the woes of the least developed countries are 
comparable to what India faced half a century ago—lack of local 
 
Government of India.  PLANNING COMM’N, 1ST FIVE YEAR PLAN intro., available at 
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/default.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2006) 
[hereinafter 1ST FIVE YEAR PLAN]. 
39. See id. 
40. Id. ch. 29, ¶ 2. 
41. Id. 
42. Press Release, World Bank, India Shows Mixed Progress in the War Against 
Poverty (Aug. 26, 1997), available at http://worldbank.org (follow “News” hyperlink; then 
“Press Releases” hyperlink; then insert date of press release). 
43. 1ST FIVE YEAR PLAN, supra note 38, ch. 32, ¶ 3.  The various epidemic diseases 
included cholera, smallpox, plague, tuberculosis, and malaria.  Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. ch. 32, ¶¶ 84, 91.  “‘Bulk drug’ means any pharmaceutical, chemical, biological 
or plant product including its salts, esters, stereo-isomers and derivatives . . . used as such or 
as an ingredient in any formulation.”  Nat’l Pharm. Pricing Auth., Drug (Prices Control) 
Order 1995, available at http://nppaindia.nic.in/drug_price95/txt1.html (last visited Jan. 8, 
2006). 
46. See Abhijit Dey et al., Pharmaceutical Marketing in India:  A Macroscopic View 
(Small Bus. Advancement Nat’l Ctr., Soc’y for Marketing Advances, 1999), available at 
http://www.sbaer.uca.edu/research/sma/1999/30.pdf; The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, No. 23 of 
1940, available at http://www.indialawinfo.com/bareacts/mainbare.html (follow “Acts” 
hyperlink; then follow “Pharma Laws” hyperlink; and then “Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940” 
hyperlink). 
47. See 1ST FIVE YEAR PLAN, supra note 38, chs. 1, 32. 
48. Banerji, supra note 33, at 79. 
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manufacturing leading to a high cost of imported drugs for which supply 
and availability are determined by foreign manufacturers. 
The Indian government took two significant steps to promote 
indigenous manufacturing of medication as a means to control the 
expenditure on public health.  First, the government signed an 
agreement with UNICEF to locally manufacture penicillin and other 
antibiotics.49  The collaboration resulted in the establishment of the 
Hindustan Antibiotics Limited in 1954 to manufacture low-cost generic 
drugs.50  Second, conscious of India’s poverty issues, the government 
appointed Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar to the Ayyangar Committee 
in 195751 to promote law reforms to improve local industrialization in 
critical areas like food and drugs.52 
B.  Towards an Indian Patent Policy 
India’s patent policy heavily relied on the Ayyangar Committee 
recommendations until joining the WTO in 1994.53  The Committee’s 
1959 Ayyangar Report laid the basis for the Indian patent regime.54  The 
Ayyangar Report is significant for its analyses of the adaptability of 
foreign patent regimes and policy options to address national issues.  
Notably, when the Ayyangar Committee was established, India was an 
underdeveloped country with economic conditions comparable to 
 
49. See 1ST FIVE YEAR PLAN, supra note 38, ch. 32. 
50. See id. 
51. Justice N. Rajaopala Ayyangar’s work on the Committee resulted in the Ayyangar 
Report.  See AYYANGAR REPORT, supra note 34. 
52. See AYYANGAR REPORT, supra note 34; Banerji, supra note 33, at 63–69.  Under 
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, the right to life is a fundamental right:  “No person shall 
be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”  
INDIA CONST. art. 21, available at http://lawmin.nic.in/coi.htm.  The Supreme Court of India 
enunciated that the right to life implies the right to a healthy life as part of the “basic 
structure” of the Constitution.  See Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SSC 225, 
(1973) A.I.R. SC 1461. 
53. The Ayyangar Report, as modified by the Report of the Joint Committee of 
Parliament in 1966, forms the backbone of the Indian patent system.  See generally 
AYYANGAR REPORT, supra note 34, ¶ 8. 
54. V.R. Krishna Iyer, Opinion, GATT, TRIPs and Patent Law—II, HINDU, Sept. 11, 
2000, at 5, available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2000/09/11/stories/05112524.htm.  
Justice Krishna Iyer, a renowned Supreme Court Justice in India, expresses his admiration for 
the Ayyangar Report:  “A well-debated, development-oriented and patriotically processed 
statute of 1970, with a progressive perspective and successful sequel, passed after a thorough 
study (based on the Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar Commission report) proved a tremendous 
national triumph for the consumer and the manufacturer alike. This finest and most just 
parliamentary achievement . . . .”  Id. 
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today’s least developed nations.55  The Ayyangar Committee specifically 
examined issues that continue to be debated in the WTO, including (1) 
whether patenting food, chemical, and pharmaceutical inventions can 
affect the underprivileged section’s accessibility to these products; and 
(2) whether compulsory licensing can enable accessibility while at the 
same time promoting innovation.56  Thus, the Ayyangar Report is 
significant for least developed nations because it highlighted the best 
practices in foreign patent regimes and examined their suitability to 
address public health and economic concerns of underdeveloped 
economies. 
1.  Patents and Underdeveloped Nations 
Like the committees that preceded it, the Ayyangar Committee 
studied the Swan Committee recommendations.57  In the Ayyangar 
Report, the Committee outlined how the Australians rejected the Swan 
Committee recommendations that were unsuitable for their local 
conditions.58  Hence, the Ayyangar Committee championed the 
adoption of a patent regime with a keen sense of achieving national 
goals.  The Committee theorized that local realities in underdeveloped 
nations cause patent regimes to operate differently than in developed 
nations.59  India, the Committee suggested, should deviate from 
unsuitable patent policies of industrialized nations.60 
 
55. See generally AYYANGAR REPORT, supra note 34 (repeatedly referring to India as 
an underdeveloped nation). 
56. See id. 
57. Id. ¶ 8. 
58. Id. ¶ 9; see also JAIN & BISWAS, supra note 27, at 1.2. 
59. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. 
 For developing countries, however, the economic calculus is different for two 
reasons. First, as net users rather than net exporters of R&D-intensive products, 
they do not benefit from the monopoly profits that are created by patent protection.  
On the contrary, their consumers suffer from the higher prices that result.  Second, 
because their markets are small in relation to global demand—at least for 
pharmaceutical products to treat a number of diseases such as cancer, hypertension, 
and ulcers—actions taken by developing countries to strengthen patent protection 
have little impact on the incentive to undertake additional R&D.  Thus, a 
combination of higher costs in the short run and the likely absence of dynamic gains 
over time means that raising levels of protection would not benefit developing 
countries. 
Arvind Subramanian, Medicines, Patents and TRIPS:  Has the Intellectual Property Pact 
Opened a Pandora’s Box for the Pharmaceuticals Industry?, FIN. & DEV. (Int’l Monetary 
Fund), Mar. 2004, at 23, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2004/03/pdf/ 
subraman.pdf. 
60. AYYANGAR REPORT, supra note 34, ¶¶ 24–25. 
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While the Ayyangar Committee suggested deviations from the 
patent regimes of industrialized nations, it also adds that it is unwise to 
shun a patent system completely.  “With all the handicaps which the 
system involves in its applications to under-developed countries, there 
are no alternative methods for achieving better results.”61  The 
Committee added that a patent system is the “most desirable method of 
encouraging inventors and rewarding them.”62  Without a patent regime, 
the Ayyangar Committee argued that “[m]anufacturers would not be 
prepared to develop and produce important machinery if others could 
get the results of their work with impunity.”63  The security and 
immunity from competition that patents provide are necessary 
inducements to work an invention.64  The Ayyangar Committee pointed 
out that even the erstwhile Soviet Union, which followed a socialist 
economic structure, provided for patents.65  A patent regime, the 
Committee asserted, is an absolute necessity to enable or improve 
industrialization, provided it is designed “with special reference to the 
economic conditions of the country, the state of its scientific and 
technological advance, its future needs[,] and other relevant factors.”66  
The fine balance between vesting monopoly rights and balancing 
welfare issues suggested in the Ayyangar Report would greatly benefit 
least developed nations that must embrace patents to encourage 
innovation while achieving national objectives. 
2.  Inventions Relating to Chemicals, Food, and Pharmaceuticals 
The Ayyangar Committee treated issues relating to patentability of 
chemicals, food, and pharmaceuticals as critical for national 
development.  Regarding chemical patents, the Committee traced the 
history of the law relating to chemical products in Europe.  A rule 
prohibiting product patents for chemicals was first introduced in the 
German Patent Law of 1877 to stimulate research in alternative 
methods of producing a product.67  Within the next thirty years, 
Germany’s process patent regime enabled the growth of the chemical 
 
61. Id. ¶ 39. 
62. Id. ¶ 43. 
63. Id. ¶ 17 (quoting the Swan Committee); see also V.R. Krishna Iyer, Human Health 
and Patent Law, FRONTLINE, Oct. 14, 2000, at 21, available at http://www.flonnet.com/fl1721/ 
17210790.htm. 
64. AYYANGAR REPORT, supra note 34, ¶ 43. 
65. Id. ¶ 40. 
66. Id. ¶ 44. 
67. Id. ¶ 58. 
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industry.68  At the end of World War I, a British Law Amendment 
Committee chaired by Lord Parker pointed to the German patent 
system and favored process protection for chemicals, food, and 
medicine.69  Consequently, the U.K. Patent Amendment Act of 1919 
passed with the amendments recommended by Lord Parker to bring 
England on par with Germany.70  Taking the German and British 
experience into consideration, the Ayyangar Committee favored 
process rather than product protection for chemicals in India.71 
With respect to patenting food, the Ayyangar Committee noted that, 
except for the United States, most other countries imposed additional 
restrictions on patents relating to food and medications.72  Even 
countries that allowed product claims for chemicals limited patent 
protection relating to food and medicines to processes: 
The French law of 1844 which permitted the patenting of 
chemical products . . . confined patents for articles of food and 
medicine to process claims.  Belgium in it Patents law of 1854 
adopted the French model.  The German law of 1877 denied 
patents to articles of food, medicinal products, though processes 
for their preparations were patentable.  The Swiss law . . . 
amended in 1954 [excludes inventions relating to medicines, 
medicinal mixtures and food products from patentability], but 
the processes for manufacturing medicine or food are 
patentable.73 
Similarly, Sweden, Spain, and Japan do not allow product claims for 
articles of food or medicine, and Demark does not allow any patents on 
food.74  The Italian Patent Act of 1957 prohibits patenting medicinal 
products.75  The Ayyangar Committee also quoted the Sargant 
Committee’s recommendation to make food affordable in England: 
 During the War it became apparent that Great Britain was 
 
68. Id.  Prior to 1877, Germany followed the French model.  Id.  Under the French 
Patent Act of 1844, patents were granted to chemical products per se.  Id.  German scientists 
and research workers attributed the failure of the French chemical industry to the French 
product patent system.  Id.  The Ayyangar Committee favorably cited the German belief that 
the grant of a product patent to chemical products per se precluded alternative processes of 
production.  Id. 
69. Id. ¶¶ 72, 75. 
70. Id. ¶¶ 72–75. 
71. Id. ¶ 56. 
72. Id. ¶ 94. 
73. Id. ¶ 95. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
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suffering from a lack of medicine and drugs, many of which were 
the subject of patent rights in this country.  On the other hand, it 
was found that in many European countries (e.g., France, 
Germany, Switzerland) such substances were not capable of 
protection under the patent laws of those countries.  In this state 
of things it was considered expedient to modify to some extent 
the monopoly consequent on the existence of patent rights in 
regard to such substances.76 
The Ayyangar Committee noted that “such important articles of 
daily use as medicine or food which are vital to the health of the 
community should be made available to every one at reasonable 
prices.”77  The Ayyangar Committee, therefore, suggested that product 
patents should not be granted in critical areas like food and medicines.78  
Vesting product patents in food and pharmaceuticals could deny vast 
sections of the population access to these critical products and violate 
the constitutional right that Indians have to life and good health.79  In 
the Report, the Committee resonated the words of Justice Krishna Iyer, 
former Justice of the Supreme Court of India, who stated that the state 
risks affecting the constitutional right to life if by oblique policy it fails 
to make medicines (or food) available or accessible to people.80  The 
Ayyangar Committee, however, specified that leaving food and 
pharmaceuticals completely unpatentable would deny India the benefits 
from new technology and, thus, would not be in the public interest.81  
Exclusive rights to the process of production would accelerate research 
in developing alternative processes.82  It was expected that process 
protection could lead to increased diversity of products at competitive 
prices,83 and that consumers would benefit from the increased 
competition in a process patent regime.  Hence, the Ayyangar 
Committee recommended limiting protection on food and medication, 
 
76. Id. ¶ 98 (citations omitted).  The Ayyangar Committee discusses the Sargant 
Report and § 38A of England’s Patents and Designs Amendment Act of 1919, which marked 
an introduction to restrictions on patent protection for food and to process patenting.  Section 
38B(2) introduced compulsory licensing of patents relating to food substances.  See id. ¶¶ 73–
99. 
77. Id. ¶ 101. 
78. Id. 
79. See Banerji, supra note 33, at 64; Iyer, supra note 63. 
80. See Iyer, supra note 63. 
81. AYYANGAR REPORT, supra note 34, ¶ 101. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
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like chemicals, to the method or the process of making the invention.84 
3.  Industrialization 
The Ayyangar Committee noted that one of the woes affecting 
underdeveloped nations is that foreign patent owners do not work the 
invention locally, thus depriving the country of competition.85  
Foreigners own patents in underdeveloped export markets to protect 
the market from rival competitors.86  Such patents do not necessarily 
benefit the underdeveloped economies.87  Thus, in underdeveloped 
economies, foreign manufacturers become the beneficiaries of the 
patent system, much to the detriment of national interests.88 
The solution identified by Ayyangar Committee is meant to 
encourage national industrialization.  The Committee, however, argued 
that patents should be worked locally to enable national 
industrialization.89  Otherwise, “the social cost involved in the grant of 
the patent [will not be] offset by any benefit to the community.”90  
Hence, the Committee suggested that patent regimes in underdeveloped 
nations should enable the local working of the inventions.91  The 
Ayyangar Committee outlined examples from developed nations.  
When the British wanted to compete with the United States and 
Germany in large-scale industrial production, the Sir Edward Fry 
Commission of 1901 recommended the local working requirement to 
industrialize Britain.92  The Committee recommended that India, like 
Britain, should ensure that inventions are worked locally to facilitate 
industrialization.93  Locally working the inventions would minimize 
importation of foreign goods.94  The resulting industrialization would 
offset the disadvantage to local manufacturers who may be unable to 
capitalize on economies of scale in other jurisdictions. 
The Ayyangar Committee outlined compulsory licensing as the 
remedy to redress the handicap of foreigners not working the invention 
 
84. Id. 
85. Id. ¶ 30. 
86. Id. ¶ 29. 
87. Id. ¶ 30. 
88. Id. ¶¶ 29–30. 
89. Id. ¶ 38. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. ¶¶ 126–27. 
93. Id. ¶ 37. 
94. Id. ¶¶ 37–38. 
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locally.95  The Committee suggested that the government should retain 
the right to compulsorily revoke patents when they are not worked 
locally and compulsorily license patents when the owners refuse to 
license them.96  The Committee canvassed compulsory licensing 
precedents from developed nations.97  After the compulsory licensing 
mechanism originated in the French Patent Act of 1791, many 
European countries adopted the provisions to encourage local working 
of inventions.98  The Ayyangar Report is supported by works of Sir 
Walterscheid, which detailed how patents were granted to lure foreign 
industries into England.99  Sir Walterscheid further asserted that Queen 
Elizabeth I made an effort “to stimulate domestic production of both 
raw materials and a wide variety of manufactured goods previously 
imported from abroad” by granting patents.100 
The Ayyangar Committee further noted that during the period when 
England benefited from foreign investments, England argued that 
compulsory licensing was inconsistent with the purpose of the 
international conventions at the Conference on Industrial Property at 
Paris in 1878.101  Later, when England suffered the consequences of 
foreign-owned British patents, the government appointed the Sir 
Edward Fry Committee in 1901 to analyze the link between compulsory 
licensing and industrial production.102  In 1907, Lloyd George, President 
of the Board of Trade, successfully introduced a bill incorporating 
compulsory licensing provisions in the House of Commons by 
highlighting that foreigners owned 6500 out of 14,700 patents issued in 
1906 and worked them outside of England.103  Consequently, compulsory 
licensing provisions were introduced in the British patents legislation.104  
The Ayyangar Committee specified that although the threat and 
competition from German industries deteriorated after World War I, 
 
95. Id. pt. V. 
96. Id. ¶ 125.  Impartial arbitrators will decide what royalties are payable for such 
licenses. 
97. Id. pt. V. 
98. Id. ¶ 125. 
99. Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents:  An Intellectual History, 
1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1261–62 (2001). 
100. Id. at 1261 (quoting Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United 
States Patent Law:  Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 855 
(1994)). 
101. AYYANGAR REPORT, supra note 34, ¶ 126. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. ¶ 129. 
104. Id. 
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the United Kingdom continued to enlarge the scope of compulsory 
licensing provisions.105  “Though the U.K. has been one of the major 
industrial countries of the post-war world, she clings with tenacity to the 
provisions regarding compulsory working . . . .”106  The Committee noted 
that, compared to the United Kingdom in 1907 to 1919, India remained 
underdeveloped even in 1947, thus justifying the need to include 
compulsory licensing provisions.107 
The Ayyangar Committee cited the United States as the only 
country in the world that did not impose compulsory licensing 
requirements.108  The Committee, however, attributed this to the 
immense wealth and abundance of resources that provided ideal 
conditions for establishing new industries.109  Therefore, the proportion 
of patents that were granted in the United States compared to those that 
were not worked locally remained very small.110  The Committee 
rationalized that the United States could afford not to adopt compulsory 
licensing in a manner that other countries could not.111  Hence, the 
Committee advocated compulsory licensing as the base carrier for the 
local working requirement.112  
Today’s least developed nations are plagued by the lack of local 
innovation.  In African countries, even the generic drugs are imported 
from countries like India.113  As early as the 1950s, the Ayyangar 
Committee not only identified the importance, but also suggested the 
means to achieve local industrialization.  The Ayyangar Report will be a 
useful tool for the TRIPs Council, whose sole task under paragraph 6 of 
the Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health is to enable local 
 
105. Id. ¶ 132. 
106. Id. ¶ 133. 





112. Id.  The Ayyangar Committee cites to § 3 of the 1902 British Patent Act, which 
introduced the principle of “revocation of patent for abuse of the monopoly by non-working” 
on the ground that the “reasonable requirements of the public with reference to the patented 
inventions have not been satisfied.”  Id. ¶ 127.  To this date, the expression “reasonable 
requirements of the public” is found in § 84 of the Indian patent legislation.  See Patents Act 
of 1970, 27 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450, § 84 (1979), available at http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipr/ 
patent/patAct1970-3-99.html. 
113. See Anne-christine d’Adesky, India’s Generics Play a High Stakes Game, 3 AM. 
FOUND. FOR AIDS RESEARCH (AMFAR) TREATMENT INSIDER 1 (2002), available at 
http://web.amfar.org/treatment/TI/June2002.pdf.  “Cambodia, Indonesia, China and South 
Korea are importing or plan to import Indian medicines.”  Id. at 3. 
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industrialization in least developed nations. 
III.  ESTABLISHING AN INDIAN PATENT REGIME 
The following Part discusses how India prioritized its national 
obligations and used legal reforms as a means to achieve international 
trading status.  The Indian Patents Act of 1970,114 along with other 
mechanisms like drug and industrial policies, was used as a tool by India 
to achieve its national priorities.  The establishment of an indigenous 
pharmaceutical industry caused the Indian government to introduce 
more trade facilitating measures.  Further, the Indian experience 
demonstrates that tackling national priorities by providing adequate 
concessions may, in fact, help least developed nations to become trading 
partners and, thus, benefit from international trade. 
A.  Indian Patent Legislation 
1.  Process Patents 
Based on the Ayyangar Report, the Indian Patents Act of 1970 
allowed differential treatment for food, medicine, and chemical 
inventions.  Rights to inventions relating to food, medicine, and 
chemicals were limited to process patent protection.115  The process 
patent regime excluded protection of the end-product, but protected the 
method or the process of making the product.116  Hence, identical 
products could be produced by several manufacturers who could each 
hold a process patent.  The process patent regime encouraged 
innovation in the methods of making known products.  The patent 
legislation enabled India to produce patented products, particularly 
pharmaceuticals, using different processes.117 
 
114. See supra note 112. 
115. The Patents Act of 1970 reads as follows: 
(1)  In the case of inventions– 
 a.  claiming substances intended for use, or capable of being used, as food or as 
 medicine or drug, or 
 b.  relating to substances prepared or produced by chemical processes 
 (including alloys, optical glass, semi-conductors and inter-metallic compounds), 
no patent shall be granted in respect of claims for the substance them selves,  
but claims for the methods or processes of manufacture shall be patentable. 
Patents Act of 1970 § 5. 
116. Id. 
117. The process patent provisions contravene the product patent regime envisioned 
under TRIPs, which stipulates that Members shall ensure patent protection “for any 
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Further, the term of process patent protection over food, drug, and 
medical inventions was limited to five years.118  Inventions in food, 
medicine, drug, and chemical processes were deemed, under § 87 of the 
Patents Act, to be automatically endorsed with a license of right after 
three years of the grant of a patent.119  A license of right authorizes any 
person to manufacture a patented product, notwithstanding the 
patentee’s approval.120  Thus, patent exclusivity was effectively enjoyed 
for only three years in these critical areas.  In introducing limited 
protection to these critical areas, India sought to encourage more 
competition.  The limited rights and protection, India envisaged, would 
balance innovation with accessibility. 
2.  Compulsory Licenses and Local Working of Patents 
Compulsory licensing provisions provided the vehicle to encourage 
local working of inventions.  The government could, in the public 
interest, interfere with patent rights and compulsorily license the 
patent.121  Patented inventions that were either not reasonably priced or 
not worked to satisfy the reasonable requirements of the public could be 
subject to compulsory licensing.122  The reasonable requirements of the 
public were deemed unsatisfied if the invention was not worked in 
India.123  Similarly, the reasonable requirements of the public were 
deemed unsatisfied if the existing or proposed trade was prejudiced, the 
demand for the product was not adequately met, or the local working of 
the invention was prejudiced due to importation.124  The compulsory 
license provision and the government’s ability to issue licenses of right 
were meant to facilitate local manufacturing of inventions.125 
The Indian patent legislation served as an important tool to establish 
and to maintain generic manufacturing capacity.  Only in 1994, after the 
 
inventions, whether product or processes, in all fields of technology.”  TRIPs Agreement, 
supra note 1, art. 27(1).  Article 27 of TRIPs requires member countries to establish a product 
patent regime.  Hence, the process patent provisions contravene Article 27. 
118. Patents Act of 1970 § 53(1)(a).  The term is limited to five years from the date of 
sealing of the patent, or seven years from the date of the patent, whichever is shorter.  Id. 
119. Id. § 87(1). 
120. Id. § 88. 
121. Id. § 84.  The Controller of Patents compulsorily licenses the patent by 
considering the nature of the invention and the applicant’s ability to work the invention to the 
public’s advantage. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. § 90(a). 
124. Id. 
125. This is true even if the government never exercised that power. 
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indigenous pharmaceutical industry was well-established, the Indian 
patent legislation underwent significant amendments.  The amendments 
to the Indian patent legislation flowed as a consequence of India’s 
membership in the WTO.  The first significant amendment to the 1970 
legislation was in 1999 when the Patents (Amendment) Act of 1999126 
introduced exclusive marketing rights.  The Amendment provided for a 
mechanism to accept product patent applications and grant exclusive 
marketing rights until India moved to a product patent regime.127  The 
subsequent Patents (Second Amendment) Act of 1999128 retained the 
process patent regime. The beginning of 2005 marked the end of the 
transitional period for developing nations outlined in Article 70(8) of 
TRIPs,129 signifying that developing nations like India had to fulfill their 
obligations under Article 70(8).130  On April 5, 2005, India’s Parliament 
enacted the third amendment to the Patents Act of 1970, the Patents 
(Amendment) Act of 2005.131  This most recent Amendment modified 
the scope of patentability for pharmaceutical inventions in order to 
move away from the process patent regime.132  Currently, the Indian 
patent legislation is fully compliant with TRIPs. 
The amended legislation certainly creates a milestone for India as 
far as establishing a TRIPs-compliant patent regime.  Notwithstanding 
the legislation itself, the larger question is the effectiveness of 
transplanting a TRIPs-compliant patent regime as a mechanism to 
achieve national or international goals.133  Generally, a sophisticated 
patent mechanism can indeed serve as an effective tool to achieve 
targeted objectives of industrialization.  The sophistication of a patent 
regime is reflected by the ability of the system to accommodate both the 
 
126. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999, No. 17, Acts of Parliament, 1999, available 
at http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patact_99.PDF. 
127. Id. § 24B.  Under the amended legislation, an exclusive marketing right will be 
granted if the claimed substance is patentable from the date of approval by the Controller of 
Patents either until the earlier of five years or until patent protection is provided. 
128. The Patents (Second Amendment) Act, 1999, No. 49, Acts of Parliament, 1999 
(introduced in the Rajya Sabha on Dec. 20, 1999), available at http://www.ficci.com/iprindia/ 
Acts_files/patent.htm. 
129. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 70(8). 
130. For detailed views of the Patents (Amendment) Ordinance from India, see 
Narayan Kulkarni et al., India Enters Product Patent Regime, BIOSPECTRUM INDIA, Jan. 6, 
2005, available at http://www.biospectrumindia.com (follow “Archive” hyperlink; and search 
by month and year). 
131. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005. 
132. Id. § 3(d). 
133. See generally J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers:  Global 
Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U.  J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 27–40 (1997). 
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original invention as well as the process or follow-on inventions.  
Adequate and appropriate procedural tools that support the patent 
system form the hallmark of such sophistication.  Developed nations 
facilitate industrial growth by using procedural tools to provide 
innovative status to follow-on inventions.  Unfortunately, developing 
nations like India lack exposure to the role procedures, especially patent 
procedures, play in implementing patent policies.  In the past, the lack 
of proper procedures in India resulted in the denial of patent protection 
for inventions distinguished through functional structural additions or 
even process innovations.134  I have argued previously that some 
innovations within India, currently labeled as “copies” of Western 
patents, may be eligible in the United States for patents using 
appropriate patent techniques.135  The same malady could result in the 
TRIPs-compliant patent regime of India.136  Thus, the amended 
legislation’s effectiveness in facilitating the Indian government’s ability 
to generate the maximum potential from India’s generic drug industry, 
which is required to maintain public health conditions, remains moot. 
B.  Drug Policies and Drug Price Control Order 
Previous discussions highlighted how the Planning Commission’s 
First Five Year Plan took stock of the state of the country at the time of 
India’s independence.  By the time India was at the Third Five Year 
Plan in 1960, the government envisaged “a large increase in the 
production of drugs in the country and replacement of imported drugs 
and raw materials by indigenous manufactures.”137  In essence, the 
government noted that although the prices of many essential drugs were 
reasonable, prices of proprietary brands remained high.138  Hence, the 
emphasis of the third planning period, 1960 to 1965, was on availability 
of quality, affordable medication.  Due to high poverty levels, the 
government felt that accessibility would be meaningless unless 
medication was also affordable.139   
 
134. See, e.g., Farbwerke Hoechst & Bruning Corp. v. Unichem Lab., 1969 A.I.R. 56 
(Bom.) 255.  See  Srividhya Ragavan, A “Patent” Restriction on Research & Development:  
Infringers or Innovators?, 2004 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 73, 87–88 (2004), for a discussion 
of the Hoechst case. 
135. Ragavan, supra note 134, at 74. 
136. Id. 
137. PLANNING COMM’N, 3RD FIVE YEAR PLAN ch. 32, ¶ 45, available at 
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/default.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). 
138. Id. ¶ 46. 
139. The Indian Constitution emphasizes balancing social and economic rights.  See 
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The government’s amendment of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act of 
1940 to give the Central Government concurrent powers with states 
over the manufacture of drugs was the first step to achieving planning 
objectives.  Further, the patent statute was complemented with two 
mechanisms to help achieve the pharmaceutical objectives over the 
years.  The patent legislation was supplemented with a Drug Policy and 
Foreign Exchange Regulations Act140 (FERA) made under the 
Industrial Policy.141  To make pharmaceuticals more affordable, FERA 
allowed governmental interference with the market using drug price 
control orders.142  To facilitate the indigenous industry, FERA limited 
the multinational corporations’ dominance in the local markets. 
Notwithstanding the objectives of the Third Five Year Plan and the 
carefully crafted Ayyangar Report, the first Drug Policy was actually a 
direct by-product of the 1962 Chinese aggression toward India.143  
Fearing the effect of war on public health, the government amended the 
Defense of India Act of 1915 to allow statutory control over drug 
prices.144  Using the statutory authority, the government passed the 
Drugs (Display of Prices) Order of 1962, which was later revised as the 
Drugs (Control of Prices) Order of 1963, and the Drugs Prices (Display 
and Control) Order of 1966.145  Each of the Orders regulated the drug 
industry.  Meanwhile, faced with the failure of the objectives of the 
Third Five Year Plan, the government requested that the Tariff 
 
INDIA CONST. pmbl.  Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees the right to life, which 
includes the right to good health.  Id. art. 21; see also Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, 
(1973) 4 SSC 225, (1973) A.I.R. SC 1461. 
140. Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, No. 46 of 1973, available at http://indiacode. 
nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=197346. 
141. See Ministry of Commerce and Indus., Dep’t of Indus. Pol’y & Promotion, 
http://dipp.nic.in/policy_dipp.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2006) (listing a sample of all the policies 
that the Department handles, including industrial development and drug policies). 
142. See David Scondras, A Visit to India:  Drug Prices, Research & Global Access, 
AIDS TREATMENT NEWS #311, Jan. 22, 1999, available at http://www.thebody.com/atn/311. 
html#india (arguing that drug prices in India are between 1000% to 4000% cheaper than drug 
prices in the United States).  For example, the price of the antibacterial drug Norfloxacin is 
$.06 in India compared to $12.26 in America.  See Banerji, supra note 33, at 83.  The anti-
inflammatory drug Piroxicam costs less than $.05 in India as compared to the American price 
of $.115.  Id.  Zidovudine (AZT), a drug retailed for $5.82 per 300 milligrams in the United 
States, is sold in India in capsule form for $1.42 per 300 milligram.  Id. 
143. Piyush Kunnapallil, Drudgery of Drug Price Controls:  Who Benefits? 1 (2002) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Ctr. for Civil Soc’y), available at 
http://www.ccsindia.org/Intern2002_11_drug_controls.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
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Commission examine prices of certain drugs in 1966.146  Following the 
Tariff Commission’s Report of 1968, the government introduced the 
Drug Price Control Order (DPCO) of 1970.147 
1.  DPCO 1970 and Foreign Corporations 
The DPCO 1970 was passed using the Central Government’s power 
under the Essential Commodities Act of 1955148 to control the essential 
commodities for streamlining supply, distribution, and availability at fair 
prices.149  The DPCO 1970 allowed for governmental control over drug 
prices, thus complementing the compulsory license provisions.150  The 
DPCO 1970 addressed concerns relating to the high cost of health 
care.151  “The legislation had a threefold purpose:  [1] to enable public 
access to essential drugs, [2] to provide a reasonable rate of return to 
companies, and [3] to ensure quality.”152 
The DPCO 1970 restricted pre-tax profit from pharmaceutical 
business to fifteen percent of sales.153  Profits exceeding the fifteen 
percent margin were appropriated by the government.154  The price 
control regime per se did not detrimentally affect the dominance of the 
multinational companies, which continued their presence in India.155  
 
146. Aradhna Aggarwal, Strategic Approach to Strengthening the International 
Competitiveness in Knowledge Based Industries:  The Indian Pharmaceutical Industry 6 
(Research & Info. Sys. for Dev. Countries, Discussion Paper No. 80, 2004), available at 
http://www.ris.org.in (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then “Discussion Papers” hyperlink).  
The Commission examined the prices of eighteen bulk drugs and their single ingredient 
formulation.  Id. 
 The Tariff Commission was established under the Tariff Commission Act of 1951, which 
functioned under the Ministry of Commerce.  Ministry of Commerce & Indus., Tariff 
Comm’n, http://tc.nic.in/ (follow “History” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).  The 
Commission’s objectives are to promote industrialization by making recommendations to the 
Central Government based on tariff studies.  Id. 
147. Aggarwal, supra note 146, at 6. 
148. The Essential Commodities Act, No. 10 of 1955, available at http://indiacode.nic. 
in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=195510. 
149. See Aggarwal, supra note 146, at 62. 
150. After the DPCO 1970 was passed, the Government of India placed most drugs 
under price control. 
151. See Kunnapallil, supra note 143, at 1–2 (discussing the DPCO).  The categories 
were meant to separate drugs most essential for the national health care programs from the 
other drugs.  The degree of price control exercised varied with the category of the drug. 
152. Rishi Gupta, TRIPS Compliance:  Dealing with the Consequences of Drug Patents 
in India, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 599, 608 (2004). 
153. Kunnapallil, supra note 143, at 2. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
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However, multinational companies curtailed launches of new products 
because they were forced to sell products at lower prices.156 
In 1973, the government introduced FERA to impose restrictions on 
foreign equity participation.157  Although the pharmaceutical industry 
was given priority status, foreign multinationals could only retain a 
maximum of 74% ownership against a general limit of 40%.158  The 
operation of FERA, along with the price control regime, resulted in 
decreasing participation of multinational companies in the Indian 
pharmaceutical sector.159  Several foreign manufacturers chose to 
consolidate their position and limit their equity holdings in India or 
assume an Indian identity.160  For instance, Reckitt & Colman, a 
multinational, was first established in India in 1934 as Atlantic (East) 
Ltd.161  In 1951, Reckitt & Colman India Ltd. took over the 
manufacturing operations of Atlantic (East) Ltd.162  The Indian 
company operated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Reckitt & Coleman 
U.K. until 1970.163  FERA regulations forced it to offer shares to the 
Indian public in 1970 to reduce its foreign holdings to 70%.164  The 
parent company’s holdings were further reduced to 40% in 1977 to 
comply with FERA regulations.165  Similarly, Dorr-Oliver (India) Ltd., 
established a presence in India in 1912 as a subsidiary of Dorr-Oliver 
Inc. U.S.A.166  Under FERA regulations, in 1977, Dorr-Oliver (India) 
Ltd. became Hindustan Dorr-Oliver Limited.167 
 
156. Ajidth Sankar, The Indian Pharma Industry under the Product Patent Regime, in 
ICFAI CTR. FOR MGMT. RESEARCH, ICMR CASE COLLECTION (BSTR/169) 5 (2005). 
157. Aggarwal, supra note 146, at 6–7.  The pharmaceutical industry was included in 
Appendix I of the Industrial Licensing Policy of 1993.  Id.  These companies’ “products were 
not being produced in India or where the local sector was being dominated by a single 
(usually foreign) company.”  Id. at 6; see also Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, No. 46 of 
1973, ¶ 29 (discussing restrictions on establishment of place of business). 
158. Aggarwal, supra note 146, at 6–7 (discussing Appendix I of the Industrial 
Licensing Policy). 
159. Id. at 17; Kunnapallil, supra note 143, at 2. 
160. Aggarwal, supra note 146, at 18–19. 
161. Indiainfonline, Global Database, Reckitt & Colman, http://www.indiainfoline.com 





166. Dorr-Oliver (India) Ltd., About Us, http://www.hind-dorroliver.com/aboutus.htm 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2006). 
167. Id. 
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2.  Striving for Indigenous Advantage 
In 1975, the government appointed a parliamentary committee 
generally known as the Hathi Committee to analyze the issues relating 
to the drug industry.168  The Hathi Committee emphasized “achieving 
self-sufficiency in medicines and ensuring abundant availability of 
essential medicines at reasonable prices.”169  It observed that foreign 
companies “thwarted attempts by indigenous units to produce bulk 
drugs by means of import-dumping and filing patent suits.”170  Hence, 
the Hathi Committee recommended the development of the indigenous 
industry by strengthening public sector pharmaceutical companies.171 
Consequently, the DPCO 1970 underwent more revisions in 1979.172  
The revised DPCO 1979 compartmentalized drugs into three 
categories—life-saving, essential, and less-essential—for exercising price 
control over 370 bulk drugs and over 4000 formulations.173  The retail 
prices of controlled formulations were decided by applying the concept 
of Maximum Allowable Post-Manufacturing Expenses174 (MAPE).  The 
most important life-saving drugs were put in Category I and carried the 
least MAPE.175  The life-saving drugs in Category I had maximum price 
control, and the less-essential drugs in Category III had the least price 
 
168. Aggarwal, supra note 146, at 7; Bejon Misra, A Study on Availability and Prices of 
Medicines in India, Voluntary Organisation in Interest of Consumer Education (VOICE) ch. 
1, § 2 (2002), available at http://nppaindia.nic.in/report/voicerep.html. 
169. Misra, supra note 168, ¶ 1.2. 
170. Aggarwal, supra note 146, at 7. 
171. Id. 
172. See Kunnapallil, supra note 143, at 2–3. 
173. Kunnapallil, supra note 143, at 2–3; Nat’l Pharm. Pricing Auth., Drug Policy 1986, 
available at http://www.nppaindia.nic.in/drug_pol86/txt1.html (discussing the 1979 Drug 
Policy and why it is being revised).  A “formulation” is a “medicine processed out of . . . bulk 
drug or drugs . . . for internal or external use for or in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or 
prevention of disease in human beings.”  Drug (Prices Control) Order 1995 § 2; see also 
Kunnapallil, supra note 143, at 1 n.3. 
174. “‘MAPE’ . . . means all costs incurred by a manufacturer from the stage of ex-
factory cost to retailing and includes trade margin and margin for the manufacturer and it 
shall not exceed one hundred per cent for indigenously manufactured Scheduled 
formulations.”  Drug (Prices Control) Order 1995 § 7.  The DPCO 1995 uses the following 
formula:  R.P. = (M.C. + C.C. + P.M. + P.C.) x (1 + MAPE/100) + ED.  Id.  The pricing 
formula used in the 1979 Drug Policy was the following:  retail price = (MC+CC+PM+PC) x 
(1+MAPE/100) + excise duty.  In this formula, “MC” represented the material cost including 
cost of bulk drugs/excipients, “CC” represented the conversion cost as per the dosage form, 
“PM” represented the cost of packing material suitable to dosage form, and PC represented 
the packaging charge worked out in accordance with established costing procedures.  Sankar, 
supra note 156, at 6 n.14. 
175. Kunnapallil, supra note 143, at 2. 
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control.176  Drugs that did not fall within any of the three categories—the 
non-essential drugs—had no price control.177  Government regulations 
favorable to public sector enterprises were encouraged, while stringent 
guidelines in the form of approval procedures were introduced to deter 
foreign companies.178  Foreign equity participation was limited to 40% 
and later to a minimal 26%.179  “[F]oreign companies had to 
indigenously manufacture bulk drugs and intermediates required for 
their formulations within a stipulated time frame.”180  It was also 
mandatory for foreign companies to set up research and development 
facilities in the country and spend at least 4% of their turnover annually 
as recurring expenditure on research and development.181  Commenting 
on the effect of the DPCO 1979, Piyush Kunnapallil wrote the 
following: 
Through this DPCO, around 80% of the Indian pharma industry 
(in value terms) was brought under strict price control.  The 
[multinational companies] were the worst hit.  With profitability 
falling steeply, they discontinued many products, especially the 
life saving products in Category I.  In addition, the industrial 
licensing requirements made it impossible for [multinational 
companies] to introduce new products.  The local players were, 
nonetheless, in a better position.  They could obtain licenses 
much easily [sic] than [multinational companies] could.  They 
were also able to speedily introduce new drugs.  The local 
players, as a result, were able to keep the coverage of DPCO low 
and fight the might of established [multinational companies].  
However, profitability wise, the Indian pharma sector went 
through its worst phase from 1979 to 1987.182 
3.  Liberalization of the Pharmaceutical Sector 
Further amendments to India’s drug policy were influenced by the 
Kelkar Committee Report in 1984.183  The Drug Policy of 1986184 
 
176. See id. at 2–3; Aggarwal, supra note 146, at 7–8. 
177. See sources cited supra note 176. 
178. Aggarwal, supra note 146, at 7; see also Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, No. 46 
of 1973. 
179. Aggarwal, supra note 146, at 7. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Kunnapallil, supra note 143, at 3. 
183. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF FIN., FINAL REPORT ON INDIRECT TAXES ch. 2 (2002), 
available at http://finmin.nic.in/kelkar/final_idt.htm. 
184. Drug Policy 1986. 
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established a new price control regime that resulted in another 
amendment to the DPCO 1979 in 1987.185  The Drug Policy of 1986 was 
meant to liberalize the pharmaceutical sector to promote growth.186  A 
minimum turnover of $1,300,000 per annum (Rs. 400 lakhs) was 
required to enforce price control.187  Pharmaceuticals having sufficient 
market competition (at least five active ingredient producers, at least 
ten formulators, and no more than forty percent of the market share) 
were exempt from price controls.188  Consequently, the revised DPCO 
1987189 reduced the number of categories for exercising price control to 
two:  Category I encompassed drugs required for the National Health 
Program,190 and Category II encompassed drugs excluded from Category 
I but considered essential for health needs.191  The MAPE in Category I 
was 75% (from 40% in the previous DPCO), and the MAPE in 
Category II was 100% (from 55% in the previous DPCO).192  The 
number of drugs under price control was reduced to 142.193  The Drug 
Policy of 1986 encouraged competition for the first time, while ensuring 
“abundant availability . . . of essential, life saving and prophylactic 
medicines of good quality” at reasonable prices.194 
By the beginning of 1991, India had begun the process of 
liberalization.  The Industrial Policy of 1991 outlined a reduction of 
governmental control over industries and private participation in 
industrial development.195  In line with the industrial policy, the Drug 
 
nic.in/drug_pol86/txt1.html. 
185. See generally Nat’l Pharm. Pricing Auth., Modifications in Drug Policy 1986 ¶ 8, 
available at http://www.nppaindia.nic.in/drug_pol86/modif86/mod1.html. 
186. See Drug Policy 1986; Aggarwal, supra note 146, at 9. 
187. Modifications in Drug Policy 1986 ¶ 22.7.2; Suresh Koshy, The Effect of TRIPS 
On Indian Patent Law:  A Pharmaceutical Industry Perspective, 1 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 4, 27 
(1995). 
188. See sources cited supra note 187. 
189. Patentmatics, Why India cannot have a clear Drug pricing policy after 57 years of 
Independence? (Sept. 2004), http://www.patentmatics.org/pub2004/pub9f.htm (discussing 
Drug (Prices Control) Order 1987). 
190. Drug Policy 1986 ¶ 5.2,; see also CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN INDUS., REPORT 
ON THE PHARM. SECTOR IN INDIA 32 (2000), available at http://www.intracen.org/sstp/Survey 
/pharma00/India-pharmacafe00-sds.pdf [hereinafter REPORT ON THE PHARM. SECTOR IN 
INDIA]; Aggarwal, supra note 146, at 9. 
191. Drug Policy 1986 ¶ 5.2; see also REPORT ON THE PHARM. SECTOR IN INDIA, 
supra note 190, at 32; Aggarwal, supra note 146, at 9. 
192. See Kunnapallil, supra note 143, at 3; Aggarwal, supra note 146, at 7–9. 
193. Kunnapallil, supra note 143, at 3. 
194. Drug Policy 1986 ¶ 1.5. 
195. MINISTRY OF INDUS., STATEMENT ON INDUS. POL’Y (1991), available at 
http://siadipp.nic.in/publicat/nip0791.htm. 
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Policy of 1986 was revised in 1994 to accommodate this renewed vigor 
and to encourage competition, liberalization, and innovation.196  
Moreover, in 1994, India became a Member of the WTO.  
Consequently, a new price control regime was established in the form of 
the DPCO 1995.197  Under the DPCO 1995, a uniform MAPE was 
introduced for formulations under price control.198  The DPCO 1995 
reduced the price-controlled pharmaceuticals to seventy-six.199  Research 
and development initiatives were encouraged by exempting active 
ingredient manufacturers from price control for ten years, provided that 
inventive processes were developed through research and 
development.200  Foreign investment was allowed up to fifty-one percent, 
and industrial licensing was abolished for most bulk drugs and their 
formulations.201  In 1997, the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority 
(NPPA) was created to review and revise existing price controls, 
monitor the prices of controlled and decontrolled drugs, and enforce the 
DPCO 1995.202  The NPPA was also given the authority to recover 
excess amounts when manufacturers charge excessive prices for drugs 
falling within the price control.203 
4.  The Current Regime 
Further liberalization ensued when FERA was replaced with the 
Foreign Exchange Management Act of 2000204 (FEMA),which allowed 
100% foreign investment in a new or existing Indian company in the 
pharmaceutical manufacturing business.  Such approval was permitted 
under the automatic route, which meant that the bureaucracy involving 
 
196. See Govindaraj & Chellaraj, supra note 22, at 7; Kunnapallil, supra note 143, at 4. 
197. Kunnapallil, supra note 143, at 4. 
198. Drug (Prices Control) Order 1995 § 7.  The possibility of allowing a uniform 
MAPE was first discussed in the Modifications in Drug Policy 1986.  See Modifications in 
Drug Policy 1986 ¶¶ 9–10. 
199. See Drug (Prices Control) Order 1995 first sched.; Kunnapallil, supra note 143, at 
4. 
200. Aggarwal, supra note 146, at 13. 
201. See also OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF INDUS. & COMMERCE, HANDBOOK OF 
INDUS. POL’Y & STATISTICS 2001, MODIFIED POL’Y FOR DRUGS & PHARMS. INDUS. ch. 1, 
Ex. No. 47, Press Note No. 4 (1994 Series), available at http://eaindustry.nic.in/handout.htm 
(follow “Press Note No. 1 (1993) to 1 (1995 Series)” hyperlink). 
202. Misra, supra note 168, ¶ 1.4; Gazette of India, O. No. 43 (E) (1970).  The Order 
was issued by the Government of India pursuant to the Modifications in Drug Policy 1996.  
The NPPA was established as an independent body of experts.  REPORT ON THE PHARM. 
SECTOR IN INDIA, supra note 190, at 29, 36; Misra, supra note 168, ¶ 1.4. 
203. Misra, supra note 168, ¶ 1.4. 
204. Foreign Exchange Management Act, No. 42 of 1999. 
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prior foreign approval was done away with.205  Similarly, the 
Pharmaceutical Policy of 2002 was made with the dual objectives of 
reducing price control and improving indigenous research and 
development.206  Price control now can be exercised in two 
circumstances:  (1) if a particular bulk drug has an annual turnover of 
Rs. 2500 lakhs (Rs. 25 Crore) and a single firm has 50% or more of the 
market share; or (2) if a bulk drug had a turnover between Rs. 1000 
lakhs (Rs. 10 Crore) and Rs. 2500 lakhs (Rs. 25 Crore) and a single firm 
has 90% or more of the market share.207  The number of drugs under 
price control was reduced to twenty-eight.208  Price control was generally 
abolished in all other cases, although the government retained the right 
to intervene in the market should prices increase abnormally.209  The 
Pharmaceutical Policy of 2002 also allowed 100% foreign investments 
for most categories of drugs, and foreign companies were allowed to 
import medication into India.210  The Policy has increased the MAPE to 
100% for all indigenously manufactured drugs and imposed a margin on 
 
205. Ames Gross & Sunil Patel, Indian Pharmaceutical Industry:  Market, Regulatory, 
Import and Investment Regime, PACIFIC BRIDGE MED. § 10.4 (2002), available at 
http://www.pacificbridgemedical.com/publications_India2.html. 
Automatic approval is not allowed in cases where industrial licensing is mandatory.  
Further, [the] “automatic approval” route is not available to foreign companies 
which either have or have had in the past a joint venture/technical collaboration/ 
trademark agreement for the same or allied product.  In such a case the foreign 
investor will have to apply to the FIPB [Foreign Investment Promotion Board].  A 
foreign investor may also acquire the whole or part of an existing company by 
buying out existing shareholders.  For this, prior permission will be needed from the 
FIPB and thereafter the RBI. 
Id. 
206. Nat’l Pricing Auth., Pharmaceutical Policy 2002 ¶ 3, available at http://nppaindia. 
nic.in/may-2002/policy-02.html. 
207. Id. § VI(a); Sankar, supra note 156, at 6. 
208. Sankar, supra note 156, at 6; see Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, No. 46 of 
1973; cf. Foreign Exchange Management Act, No. 42 of 1999. 
209. Pharmaceutical Policy 2002 § VI(a).  The government will exercise price control 
based on the Moving Annual Total (MAT) if: 
 (a) The total MAT value, arrived at as in sub-para (iv) above, in respect of any 
particular bulk drug is more than Rs.2500 lakhs (Rs.25 Crore) and the percentage 
share, as defined in sub-para (v) above, of any of the formulators is 50% or more[, 
or] 
 (b) The total MAT value, arrived at as in sub-para (iv) above, in respect of any 
particular bulk drug is less than Rs.2500 lakhs (Rs.25 Crore) but more than Rs.1000 
lakhs (Rs.10 Crore) and the percentage share, as defined in sub-para (v) above, of 
any of the formulators is 90% or more. 
Id. 
210. Pharmaceutical Policy 2002 ¶ 2. 
RAGAVAN - FORMATTED 3/3/2006  12:28:40 PM 
2006] OF THE INEQUALS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 301 
 
importers’ profitability at 50%.211  Finally, the Policy outlines that it will 
encourage the “generation of intellectual property” by indigenous 
companies.212  
The various drug price control orders present an interesting trend.  
When India became independent, the pharmaceutical sector was 
dominated by multinational companies.  In the mid-1970s, foreign 
equity participation was limited to 74%, further reduced to 40%, and 
then reduced to 26% by 1986.213  With the development of the 
pharmaceutical industry, foreign participation was again encouraged up 
to a maximum of 51% in 1994.214  By 2002, a country confident of its 
pharmaceutical abilities was willing to allow 100% foreign participation 
and importation of pharmaceuticals.215  Similarly, a country that was 
struggling in the 1970s to properly copy drugs for local requirements 
filed 33% of the global filings of drug master files and abbreviated new 
drug applications with the United States Food and Drug Administration 
in 2004.216  That same year, Ranbaxy, an Indian drug company, was 
featured among the top ten generic drug companies in the world.217  
Wockhart, another Indian company, does business in over ninety 
countries.218  Also, in 2004, Nicholas Piramal India Limited acquired the 
global inhalation anesthetics business of Rhodia Organique Fine 
Limited (Rhodia), U.K.219  The same company, in 2005, invested 17% 
equity in BioSyntech Inc., a Canadian biotech research company.220  The 
Indian pharmaceutical industry itself is ranked fourth in the world in 
terms of volume and thirteenth in terms of value.221  In creating the 
generic drug industry, the Indian policy has emphasized the availability 
of reasonably priced high quality drugs since 1947.222  The emphasis on 
 
211. Id. §§ VI(b), VI(c). 
212. Id. § V(b). 
213. Aggarwal, supra note 146, at 6–7. 
214. Id. at 8. 
215. Id. at 24. 
216. Sankar, supra note 156, at 8. 
217. Id. at 9. 
218. Id. at 10. 
219. Press Release, Nicholas Piramal India Ltd., Nicholas Piramal Acquires Rhodia’s 
global Inhalation Anaesthetics Business (Dec. 17, 2004), http://www.nicholaspiramal.com/ 
docs/NPIL-RhodiaIA.pdf. 
220. Press Release, Nicholas Pirmal India Ltd., Nicholas Piramal India Limited Invests 
17% equity in Canadian Biotech Research Company—Biosyntech, Inc. (July 7, 2005), 
http://www.nicholaspiramal.com/media_pr20.htm. 
221. Sankar, supra note 156, at 12. 
222. See generally 1ST FIVE YEAR PLAN, supra note 38. 
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reasonable price of pharmaceuticals has helped the development of the 
generic drug industry.  The development of a generic drug industry has 
helped India tackle its public health woes.  The low cost of medicines 
resulted in public health becoming accessible.  The Indian government 
gained the ability to deal with several public health conditions or a 
threat to public health independently without having to account for 
foreign imports.  This scenario should be contrasted with South Africa, 
which was forced to repeatedly ask the United States to reduce the cost 
of drugs in 1996 to handle a public health crisis.223  Similarly, increased 
private production of generic drugs allowed the government to ensure 
that infrastructural constraints impeding accessibility to medication 
were simultaneously tackled.224 
IV.  FIRST AMONG THE INEQUALS 
The important question is whether the Indian experience can be 
replicated in other nations to deal with the current health pandemics, 
given the various constraints imposed by the WTO.  The attempt to 
resolve this issue necessitates that we re-examine the objectives of 
becoming a TRIPs signatory.  The TRIPs Agreement meant to 
harmonize intellectual property while achieving the specific objectives 
of social and economic welfare outlined in Articles 7 and 8.  From this 
perspective, solutions to the paragraph 6 issue should be based on the 
notion that public health is an important component for achieving 
national and global objectives.  Unstable public health conditions can 
potentially upset national productivity, cause international disruption to 
trade, and destabilize more economies.225  The Indian experience is 
 
223. See Helene Cooper et al., AIDS Epidemic Traps Drug Firms in a Vise:  Treatment 
vs. Profits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at A1 (discussing the 1996 meeting between Jones 
Popovich, the American trade representative, and AIDS activists on the South Africa issue). 
224. The various plans show that the development of the indigenous pharmaceutical 
industry forced the government to increasingly look at infrastructural issues that were 
required to facilitate the industry.  See supra note 38.  This included improving the 
infrastructure to access the drugs, hospitals, health care education, and dissemination of 
information.  All of which are vital for improving the national public health systems. 
225. See generally Rebecca Buckman, Outbreak Crimps Toy Industry’s Buying Season, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2003, at B1 (discussing how the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) in China has affected sales in even smaller industries, like the toy industry, 
and impacted sales of several American retailers); Lori Bollinger & John Stover, Country 
Report, The Economic Impact of AIDS in South Africa, POL’Y (Futures Group Int’l Bath, 
Eng.), Sept. 1999, available at http://www.policyproject.com/pubs/SEImpact/southafr.pdf 
(discussing how the epidemic outbreaks potentially affect several sectors of the international 
economy and stunt international markets); Peter Yu, SARS and the Patent Race:  An 
Introduction to the “Patent Law, Social Policy, and Public Interest” Symposium (unpublished 
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useful for demonstrating that the TRIPs Council must appreciate that 
governments need to devise solutions by prioritizing national needs 
before catering to international trade.  Such understanding requires that 
countries are allowed (1) to use patent policies to achieve national 
ambitions but pursue their own levels of development and (2) to 
emphasize indigenous industrialization without disrupting the markets 
of other WTO Members. 
Both of the above are supported by the historical experiences of 
developed nations. Historically, every developed nation used patent 
mechanisms to protect indigenous industries.226  Even now, the 
developed countries have been unable to open the agriculture sector to 
promote fair trade by reducing subsidies, which harms the local farming 
sector but benefits international trade.  Similarly, the patent 
development curve in developed nations, particularly the United States 
and the United Kingdom, moved steadily upwards from the early 1800s 
until the mid-1900s before a sustainable patent system was crystallized.  
Thus, developed nations took about one hundred and fifty years to 
establish a sophisticated patent regime.  Forcing developing countries to 
“catch up” and ease into the current patent regime within a matter of 
only ten years may be unwise, because it pressures developing nations to 
make inappropriate choices from an incomplete understanding of patent 
mechanisms. 
Future solutions should prioritize local rather than global needs by 
increasing the term of exemption for pharmaceutical patents or 
discriminatorily pricing pharmaceuticals in a manner consistent with 
economic conditions in developing and least developed nations.  
Likewise, exceptions can be created by further extending the 
transitional periods for pharmaceutical patents.227  Alternatively, under 
the Doha Declaration, governments may be allowed to compulsorily 
license or duplicate drugs, provided that they impose adequate 
restrictions on parallel importation of generic drugs into the developed 
nations.228  Similarly, exceptions should allow the manufacturers of 
 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=451640. 
226. See generally Ragavan, supra note 10 (providing a comparative study on historical 
development). 
227. E-mail from Professor Peter K. Yu, Assistant Professor of Law, Michigan State 
University College of Law, to Srividhya Ragavan, Associate Professor of Law, University of 
Oklahoma Law Center (Sept. 25, 2005, 15:36 CST) (on file with author). 
228. See Srividhya Ragavan, The Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade:  The 
Supreme Court in PhRMA v. Walsh and the TRIPS Agreement, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 777, 796 
(2004). 
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generic drugs, like India, to export drugs to African countries without 
the impediments of Article 31(f).229  The dispute settlement body of the 
WTO should take account of national responsibilities when deciding on 
derogation from international obligations.  Thus, several solution 
alternatives are available to prioritize local rather than global needs and 
must be fully explored.  Solutions prioritizing global trade ahead of 
domestic needs may potentially harm the globe itself by destabilizing 
the economies of the world. 
CONCLUSION 
Something had to be right for the industry to be where it is today.  
While the Indian patent system lacked a western sense of sophistication, 
it certainly achieved its national objectives.  At the tenth anniversary of 
TRIPs, we should go back to the drawing board to determine the cost 
and benefits of having placed international obligations above national 
needs. With bird-flu threatening to become an epidemic, it is important 
to appreciate that some national issues may actually become a barrier to 
international trade if left unsolved.  At the very minimum, such a cost-
benefit analysis would sensitize Members to the unique national 




229. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31(f). 
